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This paper analyses the determinants of wage differentials among different ownership enterprises 
in urban China in 1995, using an extended version of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition methods. 
We find higher wages in state-owned and foreign-invested enterprises compared to urban 
collectives, but no significant difference in hourly wages between central state-owned and 
foreign-invested enterprises. Moreover, we find strong evidence for segmentation on the Chinese 
labor market, the conjunction of segmentation and differences in hours worked being the major 
determinant of observed differences. We also show that, although foreign-invested enterprises 
allow for higher global annual income, it is at the cost of longer working hours.  
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  11. Introduction 
 
Urban industrial reforms and the implied changes on the China’s labor market are one of 
the key elements in the process of China’s transition toward a market economy, as well as a main 
challenge for coming reforms in order to sustain both Chinese economic growth and social 
stability. Rather than privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the course of the reform 
process, the Chinese government decided to gradually reform the state sector, while encouraging 
at the same time the emergence of a competing non-state sector. Employment structure has thus 
been diversified with the development of a dynamic non-state sector composed of collective 
enterprises, private and individual enterprises and foreign enterprises. Meanwhile, despite reforms 
being gradually carried out, SOEs’ performance kept deteriorating and SOEs had to face many 
problems, including financial losses and over-staffing that led to massive layoffs in recent years 
(Lin et al., 2001).  
The evolution of the state and non-state sectors has had important implications on 
changes in both employment and labor income structures. Indeed, reforms led to the coexistence 
of enterprises facing very different institutional and economic environments: on one hand, SOEs 
are still operating according to the central administration’ plan or requirements, while on the 
other hand, urban collectives, private and individual enterprises, and foreign enterprises behaviors 
are more or less driven by market forces. In such a “dual” context, we can thus expect 
segmentation (and wage heterogeneity) to be a key feature of the Chinese labor market, since 
wages and employment might be largely influenced by different institutional rules, rather than 
being determined by individual characteristics differences. However, given the high heterogeneity 
in Chinese enterprise ownerships and managements, the nature of this segmentation still needs 
  2further investigation. In this paper, we thus intend to evaluate the magnitude of urban labor 
market segmentation in China and its contribution to wage differentials among different 
ownership enterprises  
The segmented labor market theory stresses that under segmentation, the labor market is 
composed of a variety of non-competing segments between which rewards to individual 
characteristics differ because of institutional barriers. Furthermore, vulnerable groups of workers 
may become trapped in the lower segment of the labor market, and the wage differentials 
between segments can not be competed away. In the case of China, the duality in the labor 
market may have several implications. Among others, Zhao (2001) pointed out that wage 
differentials between SOEs and private enterprises are one of the major forces, which should 
drive labor reallocation in China from the state sector to the non-state sector. Moreover, labor 
market segmentation between enterprises of different ownership is a potential source of growing 
income inequality in urban China (Knight and Song, 2003). 
Based on the existing literature, our paper aims at studying and analyzing the determinants 
of wage differentials between the different types of enterprises in China. Our analysis uses the 
household survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which provides 
detailed information on labor income as well as on individual and household characteristics for 
the year 1995. Available data for this particular year enable us to analyze the structure of the labor 
market after 10 years of reform in urban China and the extent to which the labor market has 
moved to a market forces driven one. Analyzing these issues might help shedding light on the 
achievements of the reforms and the remaining difficulties. We thus examine whether the 
Chinese urban labor market is segmented by ownership structure and how much this 
segmentation contributes to wage differentials among workers. We first estimate Mincer wage 
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or provincial level, local publicly owned enterprises, urban collective enterprises, and foreign-
invested enterprises. We then propose an extended form of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of 
total wage differentials into what comes from the distribution of individual characteristics, what 
comes from differences in working hours and what can be imputed to the segmentation of the 
labor market.  
Our results confirm previous findings of higher wages in SOEs and foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) compared to collective and domestic private enterprises. However, we find no 
significant difference in hourly wages between SOEs and FIEs in 1995. Indeed, even though total 
income is significantly higher in FIEs, the gap between FIEs and SOEs vanishes when 
controlling for hours worked. Moreover, we find strong evidence of a segmented labor market in 
China both between foreign and domestic enterprises, and within domestic enterprises. FIEs 
allow for higher global annual income than domestic firms, although at the cost of longer 
working hours. And, among domestic firms, central SOEs offer higher hourly wages than other 
types of enterprises. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the evolution of the labor 
market in China over the last two decades, and proposes a literature review on labor 
segmentation issues in China. Section 3 provides some descriptive statistics on wage differentials 
by type of enterprise ownership structure in 1995. Section 4 presents the methodology used for 
analyzing labor market segmentation by ownership enterprise. Section 5 studies total wage 
differentials and labor market segmentation in urban China in 1995. We first discuss econometric 
results on wage equations in the various categories of enterprise ownership and the determinants 
  4of worked hours by enterprise. We then propose decomposition results of wage gaps between 
enterprises types. Section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
2.  The evolution of the labor market in China 
 
2.1. Labor market reforms in China 
Before reforms were launched at the end of the 1970s, there was basically no labor market 
in China. Job allocation and wage-settings in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were determined 
within the central plan and a key function held by SOEs was to give employment to the whole 
working-age population. The main features of this centrally-determined wage structure were the 
following
2. First, the rigid wage determination system was accompanied by both low level wages 
and a distribution of wages based on an egalitarian principle, promotion and wage increases being 
mostly driven by seniority and qualification. In this context, SOEs were not only labor providers, 
but they also provided a number of social welfare benefits, including housing, medical care, 
pensions, etc., which were aimed at compensating for low base wages. Finally, due to the 
employment assignment system and the strictly controlled movement of the population (within 
the household registration system, hukou), labor mobility was very limited both between sectors 
and regions.  
Since China launched economic reforms at the end of the 1970s, the Chinese labor 
market experienced great changes. In particular, the emergence of the non-state sector led to a 
reallocation of the labor force out of the state sector (composed of firms under the direct control 
of the central or local governments). As indicated in Table 1, the share of the non-state sector in 
                                                 
2 A detailed description of the pre-reform wage-setting system is given in Meng (2000, chapter 2). See also Lin et al. 
(2001). 
  5employment grew steadily since 1978 and accounted for 35% in 1995
3. The non-state sector is 
composed of collective enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises
4, domestic private enterprises
5 
and individual enterprises (getihu)
6. Collective enterprises have played an important role in offering 
additional employment at the early stage of the reforms (OECD, 2002). Otherwise, domestic 
private enterprises suffered from the restricting policies such as overtax, strict regulation, limited 
access to loans and skilled employees in the 1980s. During the 1990s, domestic private enterprises 
have experienced rapid development and gradually gained legitimacy, while the weight of 
collective enterprises in the economy has been reducing. As can be seen in Table 1, within the 
non-state sector, collective enterprises saw their share going down while the “private” sector grew 
from less than 5% in 1988 to 13% in 1995. Non-state enterprises (other than collective 
enterprises) became the leading engine of reform, introducing market forces into the Chinese 
economy. These enterprises being out of the central plan, their behavior is closer to profit-
maximization objectives and they independently determine both their employment policy and 
salary scales.  
                                                 
3 In terms of industrial production, the growing importance of the non-state sector is even more remarkable: the 
non-state sector’s share of manufacturing output increased from 22.4 per cent in 1978 to 62.8 per cent in 1995. 
4 Firms with foreign ownership (sanzi qiye) are of three types: joint ventures (hezi jingying qiye), firms that have entered 
into co-operation agreements (hezuo jingying qiye) and wholly foreign-owned firms (waizi jingying qiye). Joint ventures are 
limited liability companies in which the Chinese and foreign partners invest and operate on a joint basis, sharing 
profits, losses and risks. Firms with co-operation agreements may involve a foreign partner, which provides 
technology and capital in exchange for a fixed return (Démurger, 2000). 
5 In 1988, the State Council issued the Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises (TSPE) to govern the 
registration and management of private firms. This document defined a private firm as “a for-profit organization that 
is owned by individuals and employs more than eight people.” Firms that hired eight employees or less could still be 
registered as individual enterprises (getihu). The TSPE identified three types of private firms: those under sole 
ownership, partnerships, and limited liability companies. However, it was only in March 1999 that private ownership 
and the rule of law were formally incorporated into the Chinese Constitution.  
6 There are another two forms of ownership: domestic joint-ventures (lianying qiye), and share-holding companies 
(gufenzhi qiye).   
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step, some autonomy in decision-making for employment and wages has been given to SOEs 
managers. They were authorized to retain part of their profit and share it with their employees in 
the form of bonus wage payments. Bonus wages were aimed at providing incentives to employees 
and increasing the overall productivity of SOEs. Their amount were also supposed to reflect both 
enterprise and individual performances (Coady and Wang, 2000; Meng, 2000). However, due to 
high supervision costs, the bonus has often been distributed on an egalitarian basis within 
working units, and its impact is controversial. From 1993 onwards, SOEs have been allowed to 
put workers in the situation of waiting for a job (xiagang) by giving them subsistence revenue. 
Nevertheless, State intervention continued to influence SOEs behaviors. Constrained by the 
inefficiency of their organization structure, and submitted to growing competition from the non-
state sector, SOEs have been facing a difficult situation, leading to massive lay-offs in the second 
half of 1990s. 
Both the evolution of the non-state sector and changes in the state-owned sector have 
had significant impacts on the allocation of the labor force as well as on income distribution 
among urban workers (Knight and Song, 2003; Park et al., 2003). Analyses of these changes need 
to account for the determinants of wage differentials among urban workers and in particular 
between different types of enterprises, claiming for a deeper analysis of the segmentation issue.  
 
2.2. Labor market segmentation in China: literature review 
A growing number of works has been studying changes in the China wage structure over 
the last decade. Recently, the larger availability of nation-wide household surveys has allowed for 
deeper statistical analyses of this issue, focusing on various complementary aspects. In particular, 
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education experienced by the non-state sector, including both private or individual enterprises 
and foreign-invested enterprises (Fu and Gabriel, 2000; Li, 2003; Maurer-Fazio, 1999; Zhang and 
Zhao, 2002). Another area of research focuses on the wage gap between different groups of 
workers, analyzing labor market segmentation between rural migrants and urban residents 
(Knight et al., 1999; Maurer-Fazio and Dinh, 2002; Meng and Zhang, 2001) or discrimination 
against women in urban China (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Liu et al., 2000; Qian, 1996). Most of 
these studies find that ownership structure of enterprises is a significant explanatory factor for 
observed wage gaps.  
Hence, the empirical literature on the Chinese wage structure shows the potentially 
important role of enterprises ownership in explaining wage-setting behaviors. Moreover, as 
mobility between enterprises is constrained, the urban labor market in China, characterized by the 
coexistence of very different types of enterprises, is more likely to be segmented by ownership 
type, and wage-setting behaviours may be varying as a result of differences in the market 
orientation of enterprises (Dong and Bowles, 2002). This question has been studied in various 
papers, including Putterman (1992), Howell (1997), Dong and Bowles (2002) and Zhao (2001, 
2002). The literature usually claims that the Chinese labor market is segmented by ownership. 
However, only Dong and Bowles (2002) and Zhao (2001, 2002) have done econometric analysis 
and results differ depending on data and econometric methods used. Moreover, the magnitude of 
segmentation phenomena is usually not formally evaluated.  
Dong and Bowles (2002) analyze the segmentation issue by ownership type, using survey 
data on SOEs, township and village enterprises, joint-ventures, and wholly foreign-invested 
enterprises in the light industrial goods sector in 1998. They find no significant differences in 
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in returns to experience, rewards to experience being significantly higher in foreign-invested 
enterprises than in the three other categories of ownership. They conclude in favor of a 
decreasing segmentation of the labor market by ownership, at least in the light industrial goods 
sector, and acknowledge that segmentation by firm or by regions might nevertheless be an 
important force in explaining wage differentials.  
Closer to our approach are Zhao (2001, 2002)’s papers, which look at wage differentials 
among enterprises of four types of ownership (SOEs, urban collectives, domestic private 
enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises). Zhao finds that, after taking account of non-wage 
benefits, workers in SOEs earn significantly more than workers in urban collective or domestic 
private enterprises. She claims that because of the duality of the Chinese economy, foreign-
invested enterprises have to pay a higher salary to attract skilled workers. On the opposite, they 
have access to an abundant non-skilled labor force, to which they can offer relatively low wages. 
However, the dataset used in these papers do not include direct information on hours worked, or 
details on non-wage income
7. In our paper, we take into account these two aspects in a more 
adequate way to provide in-depth analysis of the segmentation issue
8.  
 
                                                 
7 Zhao (2002) uses “secondary data” containing information on pension, housing, and health care, which cannot 
directly match the wage data used. 
8 As discussed below, CHIP data indeed include information on wages as well as bonuses, allowances, subsidies, and 
income in kind at the individual level, even though some dimensions of non-wage income are still not accounted for. 
  93.  Wage differentials in 1995: some descriptive statistics 
 
3.1. Data set and variables definition 
Our data come from the 1995 survey of the China Household Income Project (CHIP). 
These data were collected in 1996 by a team headed by the Institute of Economics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (Riskin et al., 2001), and cover 6,931 households and 21,694 
individuals in urban China. The survey covers 11 provinces
9, among which only 4 are located 
along the coast (Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong).  
The sample we use in this study is composed of 11,238 workers. We chose to consider 
only individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and earning 
(positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not included in the sample, since 
we cannot disentangle wages from profit in their case.  
The wage variable is defined as being the sum of the base salary, bonuses, allowances 
(except those allowances given while “waiting for a job”, xiagang) and subsidies (including 
housing, medical, child care and regional subsidies), other wages (including overtime wages and 
wages for special circumstances), other income from work unit (except hardship allowances) and 
income in kind. As a base for comparison in the descriptive part, we also use labor income. Labor 
income is thus composed of the wage variable, plus other income from labor (including from a 
second job) and private or individual enterprise proprietor’s pre-tax net income. Hourly wages are 
defined as the ratio between wages and the number of declared hours worked in a year.  
We consider 5 types of enterprises ownership: SOEs at central or provincial level, local 
publicly-owned enterprises, urban collective enterprises, private or individual enterprises and 
                                                 
9 The sample includes the following provinces: Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Guangdong, 
Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu and Hubei. 
  10foreign-invested enterprises (comprising both Sino-foreign joint ventures and foreign-owned 
enterprises). At the aggregate level, SOEs at central or provincial level account for 9.3% of the 
total number of SOEs, while local publicly-enterprises account for the remaining 90.7%. 
However, SOEs at central or provincial level are on average much bigger since they employ 
37.7% of the total labor force in the state-owned sector
10. 
In a preliminary step, Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on workers characteristics, by 
enterprise ownership. On average, those working in SOEs at central or provincial level tend to be 
older and have a longer work experience than in any other enterprise type, but somehow 
surprisingly, they also tend to be more educated, and working in less non-qualified jobs. Although 
not very large, the difference in terms of the average number of years of education is even 
significant between SOEs at central or provincial level and foreign-invested enterprises. SOEs at 
central or provincial level also tend to employ relatively more male workers, with a communist 
membership, on long-term contracts, but tend to be less predominantly situated in coastal 
provinces. The comparison between SOEs at central or provincial level and foreign-invested 
enterprises also reveals that, unsurprisingly, the latter tend to be much more concentrated in the 
secondary sector than in the tertiary sector, and are mostly located in coastal areas. Worker 
profiles in local publicly owned enterprises show that they are very close to the average, while in 
urban collectives, there are much more non-qualified workers and female workers.  
 
3.2. Wage differentials by ownership 
As can be seen from Table 3, both wages and labor income are the highest in foreign-
invested enterprises and the lowest in urban collectives. On average, wages for workers in 
                                                 
10 Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 1995. 
  11foreign-invested enterprises in 1995 are 71% higher than for workers in urban collectives, 58% 
higher than for workers in private or individual enterprises, 34% higher than for workers in local 
SOEs, and 17% higher than for workers in SOEs at central or provincial level. Mean tests 
confirm that workers from foreign-invested enterprises earn significantly more than workers 
from SOEs at central or provincial level, and the latter earn significantly more than workers from 
local publicly owned enterprises. Workers from urban collectives and private or individual 
enterprises come last, the difference between the two being not significant. 
The decomposition of wages by components confirms that non-wage benefits are 
important when accounting for differences between the state and the non-state sectors (Zhao, 
2002). Although our dataset might still not include all kind of non-wage benefits (such as 
pensions or some types of income in kind), Table 3 nevertheless shows that the highest bonuses 
and subsidies are indeed given in SOEs as compared to the non-state sector (both domestic and 
foreign). In particular, it shows that both central and local SOEs provide much more subsidies 
(such as housing, health care or child care subsidies) than non-state enterprises, and that in 1995, 
these subsidies accounted for nearly 20% of wages in SOEs.  
Results presented Table 3 are quite usual in the literature and seem to be common 
knowledge for Chinese workers. However, taking into account hours of work leads to quite 
different and rarely mentioned results. Indeed, as far as hourly wage is concerned (Table 4), 
employees from foreign-invested enterprises and SOEs at central or provincial level still earn 
more than in the other type of enterprises, but the difference between the two categories is no 
longer significant. Thus, although employees from foreign enterprises appear to be the best paid 
in terms of total wage, they work significantly more than employees from the state sector, which 
reduces considerably the differences in wage rates among the two categories. At the bottom of 
  12the hourly wage scale, we still find workers in private or individual enterprises, since they also 
work the longest a week (56 hours on average). Consequently, they earn much less both in terms 
of total wage and hourly wage.  
Finally, Tables 5 and 6 show total wage and hourly wage comparisons by sex, educational 
level and region. On average, men tend to be better paid than women, wages tend to increase 
with the level of education, and workers living in coastal fast-growing provinces (Jiangsu and 
Guangdong) tend to earn more than those living in non-coastal provinces. However, concerning 
the level of education, a closer look at differences reveals that in private or individual enterprises, 
a college level of education does not imply a higher salary. On the other side, in foreign-invested 
enterprises, the most remarkable effect of education is to be found for highest level of education 
(professional or college). 
 
3.3. Wage distribution by ownership 
Coefficients of variation given Table 4 reveal that the highest differences among workers 
happen to be in private or individual enterprises, while the lowest differences are observed in 
SOEs at central or provincial level. This result comes at no surprise since private enterprises 
include very different types of units, from tiny street shops to small-scale firms. These findings 
are corroborated by kernel density estimations for the distribution of income by ownership 
category, respectively for the logarithm of total wages (Figure 1) and of hourly wages (Figure 2). 
Each graph shows the distribution for the whole sample (wage, hwage) and by ownership category 
sub-sample. 
Kernel densities show a more concentrated wage distribution for SOEs and urban 
collectives (COEs) with thin distribution tails, whereas private or individual enterprises (PIEs) 
  13and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) have a much wider wage distribution. Figure 1 also tends 
to show a bimodal distribution for FIEs’ wages, with a lower second mode for lower wages. This 
result is consistent with Zhao (2001)’s hypothesis of a segmented labor market between high and 
low-educated workers within FIEs. However, once hours of work are taken into account, the 
distribution becomes unimodal (Figure 2). Once again, apparent high wages in FIEs for high 
educated workers are to be attributed in a large extent to longer working days.   
Kernel density estimations for hourly wages further illustrate our previous findings on 
differences in mean wages for SOEs and FIEs. Indeed, the difference between SOEs at central or 
provincial level and FIEs wage distributions observed for total wages (Figure 1) is much reduced 
for hourly wages. Figure 2 actually shows that the difference between the two distributions 
mostly comes from a greater variance for FIEs. Indeed, FIEs pay more workers at lower as well 
as at higher hourly wages than SOEs at central and provincial level, the modes for both 
distributions being quite similar. It is thus true that FIEs provide higher wages, especially for high 
educated workers. However, FIEs also have a wider wage scale and offer more below-average 
wages than SOEs.  
 
4.  Methodology for analyzing labor market segmentation by enterprise ownership 
 
Our objective is to explain observed wage disparities between enterprises of different 
ownership structure using an extended version of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method 
(Blinder; 1973; Oaxaca, 1973)
11. We intend here to isolate what is due to structural socio-
economical differences between workers of different types of enterprises, and what is due to a 
                                                 
11 Extensions of this type of decomposition have recently been largely developed (see Bourguignon et al., 2001). 
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counterfactual situations corresponding to income that would be earned by workers observed in 
one type of enterprise, had they been faced with the income generating model observed for 
another type of enterprise. By “income generating model” we understand the mechanisms 
through which individual income is determined by economic mechanisms given his/her socio-
economic characteristics. Comparing observed and counter-factual income thus allows for an 
evaluation of segmentation phenomena. For example, a difference between observed income for 
SOEs’ workers and the counterfactual income obtained under the “foreign enterprises model” 
provides an evaluation of the segmentation that occurs between these two types of enterprises. 
Indeed, if there was no segmentation, income under the SOEs’ model (observed income) should 
be equal to income under the FIEs’ model (counterfactual) for any given socio-economic 
characteristics.  
As mentioned above, another dimension of particular importance concerns the number 
of hours worked. Indeed, strong differences can be noticed in working times across enterprises 
types. Our decomposition thus distinguish three different dimensions: segmentation, differences 
in characteristics effects on hourly wages and difference in hours worked effects. 
 
4.1. Decomposing hourly wages differences across enterprise types 
Formally, let w  represent hourly income of individual i belonging to enterprise type s. 





i)  Individual observable socio-demographic characteristics or those of his/her 
household (x), 
ii)  Unobservable characteristics summarized (ε), 
  15iii)  A set of parameters corresponding to the wage model linking socio-demographic 
characteristics to observed income (β). 
The hourly wage generating process can thus be written as a function W of these three 
sets of arguments: 






s x W w β ε =          ( 1 )  
Within this framework, observed differences in average hourly wage between two given 
types of enterprises may come from two different potential sources: 
i)  A difference in average socio-demographic characteristics of workers in the two 
types of enterprises, 
ii)  A difference in the wage generating models between the two types of enterprises. 
The first source of differences in average hourly wages between enterprises (i) 
corresponds to market-based differences in income, since differences in socio-demographic 
characteristics such as education or age lead to differences in average wage. Different types of 
enterprises being specialized in different sectors, the socio-demographic structure of workers 
naturally differs. The latter source of differences in average hourly wage between enterprises (ii) 
reveals a segmentation process since individuals with the same socio-demographic characteristics 
will have a different wage depending on which type of enterprises they are working for.  
It is thus possible to decompose observed hourly wage differences into these two 
components as follows (2 enterprise types: s and f): 
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sf x W x W S β ε β ε − =
The “explained difference”   corresponds to the difference in income between 
workers of enterprise type s and workers of enterprise type f due to differences in individual 
i
sf E
  16characteristics x, controlling for differences in remuneration of those characteristics since all 
individuals are given the same remuneration vector s β . Symmetrically, the “segmentation effect” 
 corresponds to the difference in hourly wages due to differences in remuneration of 
individual characteristics between enterprise types s and f, for a given structure of characteristics x 
(that observed for workers in enterprise type s). The formulation can then be averaged to evaluate 
the overall mean effect.  
i
sf S
In other words, our point here is to answer the following two questions: 
i)  What would be the difference in average hourly wage between workers in 
enterprises type s and f if workers were working in the same enterprise type (i.e. facing the same 
model in terms of income determinants)? (Explained difference) 
ii)  What would be the difference in average hourly wage between workers in 
enterprises type s and f if they had the same socio-demographic characteristics? (Segmentation) 
 
4.2. Introducing the impact of differences in hours worked 
As shown earlier, the Chinese labor market shows strong differences in the number of 
hours worked by enterprise type. This dimension can in turn be included in the approach 
presented above. Indeed total wage income of individual i working in enterprise s ( ) is the 
product of hourly wage obtained in enterprise type s (w ) by the number of hours worked in 












s w h I . =              ( 4 )  
where   can be modeled for each enterprise type s as a function H of individual observable and 
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  17 Observed differences in total wages between two given types of enterprises (s and f) may 
thus be decomposed into three components as follows: 
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sf x W z H x W z H IH β ε γ η β ε γ η − =
  In the same line as for hourly wages, this decomposition corresponds to the evaluation of 
what would be the difference in average total wage income between workers in enterprises type s 
and f under the following three hypothetical conditions: 
i)  If workers were working in the same enterprise type (i.e. facing the same model in 
terms of income determinants and hours worked)? Ö IE: pure difference-in-characteristics effect. 
ii)  If workers were endowed with the same socio-demographic characteristics and if 
they were facing the same model in terms of hours worked? Ö IS: pure segmentation effect. 
ii)  If workers were endowed with the same socio-demographic characteristics and if 
they were facing the same model in terms of income determinants? Ö IH: pure difference-in-
hours worked effect. 
 
4.4. Path dependence and robustness tests 
This approach falls in the line of the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
methodology. A common problem with this methodology is path dependence. Indeed, the two 
effects are likely to depend on the reference population that is used to evaluate them. In other 
words, it is generally the case that: 
IE
sf  ≠ IE
fs and  IS
sf  ≠ IS
fs   and  IH
sf  ≠ IH
fs 
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to a potential difference in evaluation since evaluations are based on different reference 
populations. Overall, each of the three effects can be evaluated in four different ways depending 
on the base year chosen and the sequence chosen. In the application that follows, we take into 
account each alternative evaluation of the various effects and use them as a robustness test for 
the decomposition results. 
 
4.5. Practical implementation 
The implementation of the decomposition methodology includes three phases. First, we 
estimate the remuneration structure of all types of enterprises correcting for potential selection 
biases as well as equations of the number of hours worked. Second, we simulate counter-factual 
incomes for all observed workers and each enterprises types and each potential model for hours 
worked. Finally, we compute average counter-factual incomes under all combinations. 
 
5. Explaining  wage  differentials by ownership structure 
 
5.1. Income functions  
Since the choice of the type of enterprise and expected remuneration are closely linked 
mechanisms, estimating wage functions for various enterprises types implies to deal with the 
selection bias issue. Here, we model the enterprise type choice through a multinomial Logit 
model (see Appendix 1) and we estimate Mincerian earning functions correcting for selection 
  19biases through the procedure proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984)
 12. Table 7 thus presents 
results of Mincer-type wage regressions by enterprise ownership
13, estimated using Dubin-
McFadden bias correction method. As previously stated, the wage variable is measured by hourly 
wage in 1995. The specification includes human capital characteristics (education and experience), 
the economic sector and geographical residence variables
14.  
We chose not to estimate income functions for private or individual enterprises, and thus 
drop them from the subsequent analysis for the following reasons. First, since we restrict our 
analysis to workers earning a salary, and due to the fact that most of the private or individual 
enterprises are of a very small size, we had too few observations to estimate consistent earning 
functions for this category. Second, these private or individual enterprises include very different 
economic situations, which are difficult to account for in the estimation, without further splitting 
the sample. 
Wage equation regressions reported in Table 7 show higher returns to education in 
foreign-invested enterprises. In terms of gender differences, returns to education appear to be 
higher for women, especially in SOEs at central or provincial level. For men, returns to education 
are higher in local publicly-owned enterprises than in SOEs at central or provincial level, while 
for women, they are roughly the same. For both men and women, we do not find any significant 
                                                 
12 See Bourguignon et al. (2004) for a discussion of Dubin and McFadden (1984) advantage over Lee (1983) approach 
to selection bias correction with a multinomial Logit model.  
13 Chow tests performed to test the null hypothesis that the β-coefficients in wage equations between two different 
enterprise ownerships are the same, all indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1 percent level. 
14 The reference categories for the regional location and the economic sector are respectively non-coastal region and 
secondary sector (industry and construction). Most of the studies on the wage structure in China also include 
Communist Party membership to account for a potential premium paid to Communist Party members (among 
others, see Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Knight and Song, 2003; Li, 2003; Yueh, 2004). The corresponding earning 
estimates, on pooled data for all types of enterprises, usually indicate that the wage premium for Party membership 
ranges between 7 to 10%. In our estimations, however, being a Communist Party member does not significantly raise 
wages, which might indicate that findings on pooled data are strongly linked with enterprise ownership. 
  20returns to education in urban collectives, indicating that in these enterprises, education is not a 
decisive criterion for wage setting. Indeed, as seen in the descriptive part, workers in urban 
collectives tend to be less educated than the average of the sample. Compared to Dong and 
Bowles (2002)
15, we find higher returns to education, ranging from 2% to 7% for one additional 
year of schooling depending on enterprise ownership. Our results are however consistent with Li 
(2003), Yueh (2004) and Zhao (2002)
16.  
The usual concave form for actual work experience
17 is found for SOEs and urban 
collectives but returns to experience are not significant for foreign-invested enterprises. The 
estimation of separate earning functions by ownership shows that wage peaks are not uniform 
across both ownership and gender (see the bottom line of Table 7). First, differences between 
men and women can be observed with steeper but more concave returns to experience for 
women in all enterprises. Women thus reach their wage peak on average 3 to 13 years earlier than 
men, depending on the type of enterprise. The same order of difference between men and 
women has been found on pooled data for all types of enterprises by Li (2003). Moreover, 
differences in wage peaks between SOEs and urban collectives show that in the former, returns 
to experience tend to actually not be decreasing for men since the maximum earning is at 40 to 44 
years of experience. This result is consistent with Meng and Kidd (1997), who found that the 
                                                 
15 Their estimation is based on 1998 enterprise survey data from Dalian and Xiamen. Their estimated rate of returns 
to education is 2.3% and they find none of the interactive ownership dummies on human capital variables to be 
statistically significant. 
16 Using the same data base (CHIP) for 1995, Li (2003) gets an overall return to education of 5.3% for hourly wages. 
Moreover, taking together private or individual enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises as the private sector, he 
finds that the private sector rewards the highly educated more, while the state-owned sector rewards the less 
educated more. Yueh (2004) also finds that in 1995, an additional year of education is associated with a 4% increase 
in income. Using a 1996 urban household survey, Zhao (2002) finds the returns to education to be 4.2% for SOEs, 
3.2% for collective enterprises, and 7.9% for foreign-invested enterprises. 
17 We use the actual number of years of work experience given by the 1995 CHIP survey. 
  21experience profile rises continuously until retirement in the state-owned sector
18. Lower wage 
peaks found by Knight and Song (2003), Li (2003) and Yueh (2004)
19 are more in line with wage 
peaks in urban collectives. The observed difference in experience earning profile between SOEs 
and urban collectives can be interpreted in terms of market forces at work in the determination of 
wages. It suggests that in 1995, market forces were playing a bigger role in wage setting in urban 
collectives than in SOEs, where the resistance to changes in wage determination (particularly 
concerning seniority rewarding) is stronger. Finally, the absence of significant returns to 
experience in foreign-invested enterprises stresses the fact that, as shown in descriptive statistics 
(Table 2), workers in foreign-invested enterprises are much younger and have much less 
experience than the average. Moreover, it also highlights the specificity of this newly developed 
form of ownership, in which experience accumulated on former SOEs positions does not 
correspond to strong efficiency gains. 
When we look at wage differentials by geographical location, we find that workers in 
coastal provinces earn on average 30 to 60% more than workers in western provinces. This result 
holds for any kind of ownership and the gap is the highest for men in foreign-invested 
enterprises. Finally, concerning the economic sector of the job, those working in the tertiary 
sector in local SOEs tend to be better paid than those working in the secondary sector. On the 
contrary, male workers in urban collectives employed in the tertiary sector earn significantly lower 
wages than those employed in industry or construction. For both central SOEs and foreign-
                                                 
18 They use data from a firm-based employee survey for the period 1981-87, and estimate total wage equations for 
1981 and 1987.  
19 They all use the same data base (CHIP) for 1995 and provide estimation on pooled data for all types of enterprises. 
Li (2003) estimates an hourly wage function, while both Knight and Song (2003) and Yueh (2004) estimate total 
earning functions. 
  22invested enterprises, wage differences among economic sectors are less clear-cut, which indicates 
a lower degree of segmentation between economic sectors in these enterprises.  
To summarize, income function estimations provide a first insight on segmentation in the 
Chinese labor market. Indeed, estimation results are significantly different for the four types of 
enterprises studied, with large differences observed for return to education (higher in foreign-
invested enterprises), as well as returns to experience (higher in SOEs and urban collectives). 
These results already show that segmentation is taking place since they predict that identical 
individuals would be offered different wages in different types of enterprises.  
 
5.2. The determinants of worked hours by enterprise 
As shown by Table 4, the average number of hours worked per week is not uniform 
among enterprises of different ownership, the highest being in foreign-invested enterprises and 
the lowest in SOEs at central or provincial level. To take account of these differences in our 
simulations, we estimated equations of working hours controlling for both differences in the 
population structure and differences between ownership. We thus included individual 
characteristics, provincial location and ownership dummy variables as determinants of the 
number of hours worked in a week. Differences between ownership dummies are thus assumed 
to represent mean differences between enterprises, once individual characteristics have been 
taken into account. 
Table 8 gives the estimated coefficients of ownership dummy variables for both men and 
women (the full estimation is given in Appendix 2). The reference category is the SOEs at central 
or provincial level. As can be seen from these estimates, there are strong differences in the 
number of hours worked a week between different ownership, after controlling for individual 
  23characteristics
20. As suggested before, those working in foreign-invested enterprises have a much 
longer working week than workers in any other enterprises and even, among domestic 
enterprises, differences are significant with central SOEs. 
 
5.3. Decomposition of observed wage differences  
Following the methodology presented above, we can now use income functions 
estimation results to decompose wage differentials into what comes from structural socio-
economical differences between workers in the various types of enterprises (characteristics 
effects), what comes from the number of hours worked a week (working hours effect)  and what 
comes from segmentation on the labor market (segmentation effect). Results from this 
decomposition are given in Table 9 for the whole population of workers (male and female). As 
discussed in Section 4.4, each “couple” of ownership leads to different simulations depending on 
the simulation base, which provide robustness checks for the results. The range of simulated 
effects for each component is thus represented by a corresponding “min-max interval” in Table 
9, which measures the extent to which the simulated effects are sensitive to the choice of the 
reference ownership used for the simulation
21.  
As discussed above, for both men and women, the average total wage is the highest in 
foreign-invested enterprises, followed by SOEs at central or provincial level, local publicly-owned 
enterprises, and urban collectives. Decomposition results provide a direct evaluation of the 
segmentation taking place on the Chinese labor market between enterprises of different 
                                                 
20 All differences are statistically significant at the one percent level except between local SOEs and urban collectives 
for which the difference is significant at the 10 percent level for men and at the five percent level for women. 
21 Moreover, our results appeared to be robust to changes in both specifications (with different sets of explanatory 
variables in the wage equations) and methods for selection bias correction (Lee, 1983; Bourguignon et al., 2004), 
which have not been reported here. 
  24ownership structure. Two main categories of results are obtained: i) observed wage gap entirely 
due to segmentation and the number of worked hours, controlling for differences in individual 
characteristics of workers; ii) observed wage gap resulting from the conjunction of segmentation, 
number of worked hours and differences in individual characteristics of workers. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, Table 9 shows that total wage gaps 
between the different types of enterprise ownership in urban China come from segmentation and 
hours effects, rather than from differences in characteristics. Indeed, except for urban collectives 
whose characteristics appear to be much lower than other enterprises, most of the observed wage 
gaps can be attributed to the conjunction of segmentation and differences in worked hours. This 
result stresses that segmentation in the Chinese labor market is an important explanation for 
wages differentials among workers. 
Interestingly, our results also show that the importance of the number of hours worked is 
crucial when explaining wage differentials between foreign-invested firms on one hand, and 
domestic firms, on the other hand, while it is of a much smaller importance in explaining wage 
differences among domestic firms (central SOEs, local SOEs and urban collectives). In terms of 
segmentation, our results show an overall segmentation phenomenon in favor of foreign-invested 
firms against all domestic firms (whatever their ownership structure), and among domestics firms, 
a strong segmentation in favor of both central and local SOEs against urban collectives. 
More precisely, concerning wage differentials between domestic and foreign enterprises, 
the observed average wage gap, in favor of the latter, ranges from 1300 Yuan per year (central 
SOEs) to 3300 Yuan per year (urban collective). As indicated by the “min-max interval” reported 
in Table 9, the evaluated effect of differences in characteristics for both central and local SOEs as 
compared to foreign-invested enterprises is very small and sensitive to the choice of the reference 
  25ownership. This effect is thus ambiguous and of minor magnitude in explaining wage differentials 
with both central and local SOEs, which in turn implies that segmentation and the number of 
hours worked are the main explanations. Moreover, although for both local SOEs and urban 
collectives, the observed wage gap with foreign-invested enterprises mainly results from 
segmentation forces (between 60 to 80% of the global “segmentation and hours” effect), the 
decomposition of the wage gap with central SOEs reveals that two-third of the difference can be 
accounted for by differences in hours worked, and only one-third results from segmentation 
phenomena in favor of foreign-invested firms. Our results thus confirm that foreign-invested 
enterprises tend to pay on average higher wages than domestic enterprises, although they also 
tend to ask their employees to work more. Higher total annual wages in foreign-invested 
enterprises are thus mostly obtained at the cost of higher working hours. Indeed, concerning the 
specific case of comparison between FIEs and SOEs at central or provincial level, segmentation 
effects lead only to a yearly pay premium ranging between 2.7% and 6.4%. 
Observed wage gaps are much lower among domestic firms, ranging from 760 Yuan per 
year (between central and local SOEs) to 2000 Yuan per year (between central SOEs and urban 
collectives). Table 9 shows that observed wages gaps between SOEs (both central and local) and 
urban collectives result from the combination of segmentation phenomena and differences in 
workers’ socio-economic characteristics, with a much greater importance of the first effect 
(between two-third and 90% of the overall observed gap). On the opposite, differences in the 
number of hours worked do not appear to be an important factor in explaining the gap between 
SOEs and collectives. Indeed, for both central and local SOEs, the difference would even result 
in higher wages in urban collectives of 2 to 5% per year. These results highlight the much 
  26protected situation of workers in SOEs at central or provincial level, which are offered higher 
wages than workers in other types of domestic (as opposed to foreign) enterprises. 
Finally, Table 9 also shows that higher wages in central SOEs compared to local SOEs are 
entirely due to segmentation forces since differences in individual characteristics of workers 
would even predict a (small) gap in favor of local SOEs, as would the difference in worked 
hours
22. Hence, workers in central SOEs appear to be even more protected than workers in local 
SOEs, which is not surprising since central SOEs tend to be considered as the pillar of the 
economy, and are thus highly protected. 
We thus find a hierarchical segmentation on the Chinese labor market concerning total 
wages. Controlling for differences in workers socio-economic characteristics, foreign-invested 
enterprises are the highest paying enterprises before SOEs at central or provincial level, local 
SOEs, and urban collectives. This ranking mostly corresponds to the ranking of observed total 
wages. Segmentation is a key factor explaining wage gaps between enterprises of different 
ownership. However, wage differences between foreign-invested enterprises and SOEs at central 
or provincial level are mostly due to differences in hours worked. 
 
6. Concluding  remarks 
 
In this paper, we have analyzed the determinants of wage differentials between four 
categories of enterprises (SOEs at central or provincial level, local publicly-owned enterprises, 
urban collective enterprises, and foreign-invested enterprises), in urban China in 1995. As 
discussed in the empirical literature on the labor market in China, the segmentation issue is 
                                                 
22 For the latter, the increase would be of 125-150 Yuan per year, that is to say an increase in total wage about 2% for 
workers in local SOEs. 
  27crucial since the dualism that characterizes the emerging Chinese labor market entails potential 
sources of growing income inequality among urban workers.   
We find strong evidence for segmentation on the Chinese labor market in 1995, the 
conjunction of segmentation and differences in hours worked being the major determinants of 
observed differences in average wages between enterprises’ types. More specifically, we find 
evidence of a strong segmentation both among domestic enterprises and between domestic and 
foreign enterprises.  
Within domestic enterprises, we find that the observed wage gaps between both central 
and local SOEs and urban collectives come from the combination of a strong segmentation 
phenomenon and differences in workers’ characteristics, while the difference between central 
SOEs and local SOEs is entirely due to segmentation forces. Our results thus suggest that over-
protected SOEs at central or provincial level provide above-market wages to their employees in 
1995, as compared to other domestic firms. This interpretation falls in the line of discussions on 
over-employment in SOEs and on the slow pace at which other enterprises are absorbing this 
excess labor. Indeed, since SOEs at central or provincial level were providing better payment 
than any other (domestic) alternatives, it comes at no surprise that local SOEs and urban 
collectives failed to drive workers out of large SOEs. Following this line of analysis, it can be 
expected that further reforms of the state sector undertaken since 1995 would have resulted in 
decreasing segmentation (market forces playing a greater role in wage determination) and 
increasing incentives for turning out of large SOEs. 
Our results also show important wage differentials between domestic and foreign 
enterprises in 1995, FIEs offering much higher total wages than any domestic enterprise. 
Segmentation and differences in hours worked are the main explanations for these differentials, 
  28the contribution of each component varying with enterprises. Indeed, for both local SOEs and 
urban collectives, the observed wage gap with foreign-invested enterprises mainly results from 
segmentation forces. But, the decomposition of the wage gap with central SOEs reveals that 
differences in hours worked explain two-third of the wage differential, while segmentation only 
leads to a yearly pay premium ranging from 2.7% to 6.4%. Hence, foreign-invested enterprises 
are mainly offering higher total annual wages than central SOEs at the cost of higher working 
hours. It is quite likely that most workers in foreign-invested enterprises are attracted by higher 
total annual wages rather than higher hourly wages. Indeed, as shown in the descriptive part of 
the paper, hourly wages are not statistically different between central SOEs and foreign-invested 
enterprises, and the difference may even turn in favor of central SOEs if all unobserved non-
wage benefits offered by SOEs could be taken into account. 
Lastly, as mentioned above, the empirical analysis provided in this paper suffers from a 
main drawback coming from the fact that it relies on only one specific year (1995). It is thus 
difficult to draw inferences for the most recent period since the labor market conditions have 
changed dramatically over the last decade, especially since the SOEs reforms were launched from 
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1978 78.3 21.5  -  -  0.2 
1980 76.2  23  -  -  0.8 
1983 74.7 23.4  -  -  1.9 
1984 70.6 26.3  -  -  2.8 
1985 70.2  26  0.05  -  3.5 
1986 70.2 25.7  0.09  -  3.6 
1987 70 25.3  0.15  -  4.1 
1988 70 24.7  0.2  -  4.6 
1989 70.2 24.3  0.3  -  4.5 
1990 70.2  24  0.4  0.4  4.2 
1991 69.9 23.8  0.6  0.4  4.5 
1992 69.7 23.2  0.9  0.6  4.7 
1993 68.4 21.3  0.8  1.2  5.8 
1994 66.7 19.5  1.2  2  7.3 
1995 64.9 18.1  1.4  2.8  9 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1994, 1996). 
Note: From 1984, percentages do not sum up to 100% because of the existence of other ownership types. 
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Number of obs.  10356  2802  5717  1621  86  130 
%   27.1  55.2  15.7  0.8  1.3 
Male (%)  52.9  60.2  53.3  39.2  45.3  54.6 
Average age (years)  38.4  39.3  38.3  37.9  32.7  31.1 
Standard deviation  9.4  9.7  9.3  8.8  9.4  10 
Education (years)  11.5  12  11.7  10  9.9  11.5 
Standard deviation  2.7  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.6  2.5 
Experience  (years) 19.3  20.3 19.4  18.2 10.8 12.1 
Standard deviation  9.5  9.9  9.4  8.8  7.8  9.6 
Communist (%)  24.7  29  26.9  12  3.5  9.2 
Coast (%)  26  19.9  26.1  32.1  41.9  66.9 
Primary sector (%)  2.8  5.3  2.1  1.2  -  - 
Secondary sector (%)  45.9  43.1  42.3  63.2  17.4  61.5 
Tertiary sector (%)  51.4  51.5  55.6  35.6  82.6  38.5 
Long-term tenure (%)  96.4  98.7  98.6  91.8  6.1  61.4 
Non-qualified (%)  16.7  11  15.4  31.3  11.6  18.5 
Notes: 1. Long-term tenure includes both permanent workers and long-term contract workers, as opposed to 
temporary or short-term contract workers. 
2. The primary sector includes agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishing or water conservancy, and 
mining and geological survey and prospecting. The secondary sector includes industry and construction. The 
tertiary sector is composed of other economic sectors. 
3. Experience is the number of years of work experience declared by the respondent. 
4. The coastal region includes Beijing, Guangdong, and Jiangsu. 
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Ownership 
categories 














Number of obs.  3094  6182  1702  113  147 
Wage 6997  6140  4795  5208  8213 
    Base wage  4021  3519  3077  4867  6528 
     (%)  (57.5) (57.3)  (64.2)  (93.5)  (79.5) 
    Bonus  1044  996  730  213  929 
     (%)  (14.9) (16.2)  (15.2)  (4.1)  (11.3) 
    Subsidies  1323  1088  631  58  479 
     (%)  (18.9) (17.7)  (13.2)  (1.1) (5.8) 
    Income in kind  118  92  67  70  87 
     (%)  (1.7) (1.5)  (1.4)  (1.3)  (1.1) 
Labor income  7078  6243  4953  6422  8259 
Source: Calculated by authors with the 1995 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: 1. The sample includes individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and earning 
(positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not considered. 
2. The wage variable is defined as being the sum of the base salary, bonuses, allowances and subsidies, other 
wages, other income from work unit and income in kind. 
3. Labor income is composed of the wage variable, plus other income from labor and private or individual 
enterprise proprietor’s pre-tax net income. 
 
Table 4 – Total wage, hourly wage and number of hours worked in 1995 














Number of obs.  3094  6182  1702  113  147 
Average wage  6997  6140  4795  5208  8213 
Coefficient of variation  0.51  0.59  0.68  0.92  0.76 
Average hourly wage  3.49  3.02  2.41  2.04  3.73 
Coefficient of variation  0.64  0.71  0.83  0.996  0.80 
Worked hours per week  41.4  42.3  43.3  56  47 
Coefficient of variation  0.17  0.18  0.22  0.29  0.19 
Source: Calculated by authors with the 1995 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: See Table 2. The worked hours per week are calculated by multiplying the number of work hours on an 
average day by average number of work days per week in 1995. 
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Notes:   1. The sample includes individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and 
earning (positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not considered. 
2. Number of observations between brackets. 
3. “Coast” refers to Jiangsu and Guangdong. 
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Notes:   See Table 5. 
 
  37Table 7 - Wage equation estimations 
  Central SOEs  Local SOEs  COEs  FIEs 
  Men  Women  Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Education 0.024  0.040  0.036  0.048  0.023  0.020  0.073  0.077 
  2.74  2.70  4.38  3.92  1.22  1.08  1.98  2.90 
Experience 0.034  0.052  0.040  0.066  0.053  0.061  -0.011  0.043 
  5.48  4.65  7.20  7.57  3.74  4.58  -0.33  1.64 
Experience
2 -0.0004  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0012  -0.001  -0.0013  0.0007  -0.0003 
  -2.92  -2.70  -4.12  -4.68  -2.96  -3.38  0.71  -0.41 
Tertiary sect.  0.040  0.036  0.056  0.052  -0.121  -0.009 -0.251 0.242 
  1.53  0.90  2.87  2.10  -1.86  -0.20 -1.38 1.82 
Coast 0.362  0.318  0.459  0.400  0.393  0.512 0.292 0.500 
  9.89  5.90  14.48  9.92  5.39  9.48 1.55 3.55 
_m1     0.167  0.621  0.723  0.996     
     1.08  3.43  2.00  2.78     
_m2 -0.221  -0.814      -1.410  -1.169    
  -1.11 -3.00      -3.89  -2.90     
_m3  0.087  0.489  0.158  0.032      
  0.34  1.55  0.76  0.14      
_m4 -1.058  0.024  -0.761  -0.929 -0.386 -0.467     
  -2.59 0.05 -2.16  -2.66  -0.81  -1.21     
_m5 1.178  0.081  0.921  0.863  0.909  0.493     
  2.63 0.18 2.31  2.41  1.49  1.27     
Constant 0.133  -0.943  0.284  0.082 -1.122  -0.960 0.056 -0.686 
  0.83  -3.07  1.56  0.30  -5.39  -5.10  0.10 -1.74 
            
Observations 1588  1065  2977  2622  625  977  71  59 
Adjusted R
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Notes:   1. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wage. The four categories are: central or provincial 
SOEs, local SOEs, urban collective enterprises (COEs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). 
2. The reference category for regional location is the non-coastal region. The coastal dummy variable takes 1 
for Beijing, Jiangsu and Guangdong, and 0 for other provinces.  
3. The reference category for the economic sector is the secondary sector (including industry and 
construction).  
4. The Hausman test for selection bias indicates that selection bias correction (using the Dubin-McFadden 
method) is needed for central SOEs, local SOEs, and COEs only. Estimations for FIEs are made using 
standard OLS. Bootstrapped standard errors are calculated using 500 replications for central SOEs, local 
SOEs, and COEs. 
5. The estimated wage peaks from the coefficients of Experience and Experience2 are given in years of 
experience. 
  38Table 8 – Differences in working hours by ownership enterprises 
 Men  Women 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic 
Local  SOEs  1.108 4.48 0.430  1.62 
Urban  collectives  1.711 4.43 1.086  3.19 
Foreign-invested  enterprises  5.314 5.46 5.221  5.25 
#  Observations  5261  4723   
Notes: Dummy variable coefficients extracted from the estimation of a number of working hours equation including 
individual characteristics (see Appendix 2). The reference category is “State-owned enterprises at central or provincial 
level”. 
 
  39Table 9 – Decomposition of the wage differentials
1 
Ownership Average  wage  Difference Effect on the observed wage difference of 
      Characteristics  Segmentation + Hours  Segmentation  Hours 
(A)                   
           
(B) YA  YB  YA - YB  Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
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 Notes:   1. Decompositions based on regressions results presented in Table 7 and Table 8. The values refer to measured effects evaluated as wage differences in Yuan. Percentages 
indicated in parentheses refer to measured effects as a percentage of observed total wage gap. 
2. CSOEs refer to SOEs at central or provincial level, LSOEs to local publicly-owned enterprises, COEs to urban collective enterprises, and FIEs to foreign-invested enterprises.  







6.8 7.8 8.8 9.8 10.8
Wage Central and provincial SOEs Local SOEs COEs PIEs FIEs
 
Notes: In order to better visualize the density distribution, we consider the logarithm of the total wage only 
for those with total wage above 1000. Wage represents the total wage distribution of the whole sample. 
Local SOEs refer to local publicly owned enterprises, COEs to urban collective enterprises, PIEs to private 
or individual enterprises, and FIEs to foreign invested enterprises. 
 







- 2 - 101234
Hwage Central and provincial SOEs Local SOEs COEs PIEs FIEs
 
Notes: see Figure 1. Hwage represents the hourly wage distribution of the whole sample. 
  41Appendix 1 – Estimation results of the Multinomial Logit Model  
for enterprise ownership choice 








































































































































Way by which workers got 



















































































































































































Number of observations  Men: 5300    Women: 4770 
Log likelihood     Men: -4974    Women: -4681 
 
Notes: The dummy variables by province are not presented in the table. The base category is “State-owned enterprises 
at central or provincial level”. 
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Appendix 2 – Working hours determinants by ownership enterprises 
 Men  Women 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic 
Education  -0.301 -7.11 -0.272  -5.96 
Age 0.060  0.56  -0.167  -1.36 
Age² -0.001  -0.87  0.002  1.05 
Communist 0.450  1.79  -0.74  -0.24 
# children under 6  0.173  0.53  -0.280  -0.88 
# children at school  -0.123 -0.46 -0.319  -1.22 
# dependent members  -0.368  -0.90  0.130  0.33 
Size of household  1.318  2.01  2.021  3.04 
Way by which workers got their current job:       
Employment agency  -0.108  -0.10  1.225  1.57 
Inherited -1.149  -2.16  0.078  0.17 
Self-found  0.785 2.09 0.144  0.45 
Other -0.215  -0.37 -1.219  -2.51 
Relationship to the head of household:      
Spouse  0.126 0.49 0.172  0.71 
Child 0.179  0.32  -0.637  -1.07 
Others -1.231  -0.91  0.029  0.04 
Local  SOEs  1.108 4.48 0.430  1.62 
Urban  collectives  1.711 4.43 1.086  3.19 
Foreign-invested  enterprises  5.314 5.46 5.221  5.25 
Constant     44.989  16.63 
#  Observations  5261  4723   
Adjusted R
2  0.04  0.05   
Notes: The dummy variables by province are not presented in the table. 
 